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INTRODUCTION

In 1923, the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Frederick
Banting and James Macleod “for the discovery of insulin.”1 In his Nobel lecture
in 1925, Banting delivered a technical description of the discovery and its applications, concluding with the observation that insulin would not cure diabetes,
but would provide diabetics with the ability to cope with “the economic burdens
of life.”2 Having sold his patent on the discovery to the University of Toronto
for only a dollar in the interest of public health,3 Banting could not have fathomed how ironic his concluding remark would become.
The economic burdens of life with diabetes have ballooned, with patients in
the United States experiencing a 700% increase in the price of insulin in the past
two decades.4 For those who rely on insulin, the individual health consequences
of skyrocketing prices can be disastrous. Insufficient insulin can lead to critical
health problems, including renal failure, amputation, heart disease, blindness, and
even death.5
Currently, ninety percent of the world’s supply of insulin, and one hundred
percent of the U.S.’s supply, come from just three drug manufacturers: Eli Lilly,
Novo Nordisk, and Sanofi.6 Although these manufacturers have attempted to
reduce their prices in response to recent public and congressional outrage,7 more
could still be done. Policy changes to the intellectual property protections surrounding biologic drugs would help to ensure continued access to insulin for the
millions of Americans who rely on the drug.
The intellectual property protections available to manufacturers of pharmaceuticals in the United States include patent, regulatory exclusivity, and trade

1 THE NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE 1923, NOBEL PRIZE https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1923/summary/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
2 Frederick G. Banting Nobel Lecture, Diabetes and Insulin (Sept. 15, 1925), in NOBEL
LECTURES, PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE 1922-1941 (Elsevier Publishing Co. 1965),
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1923/banting/lecture/.
3 Jeremy A. Greene & Kevin R. Riggs, Why Is There No Generic Insulin? Historical Origins of a
Modern Problem, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1171 (2015).
4 Drew Pendergrass, How Insulin Became Unaffordable, HARV. POL. REV. (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/how-insulin-became-unaffordable/ (noting that
price increase accounts for inflation).
5 Id.; Tiffany Stanley, Life, Death, and Insulin, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/07/feature/insulin-is-alifesaving-drug-but-it-has-become-intolerably-expensive-and-the-consequences-can-betragic/.
6 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018).
7 Stine Jacobsen, Novo Nordisk to cut insulin prices in the U.S., THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 6,
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-novo-nordisk-usa/novo-nordisk-to-cut-insulinprices-in-the-us-idUSKCN1VR1JO.
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secrecy.8 Makers of insulin rely heavily on trade secrecy, a protection that can
theoretically last forever, to prevent their manufacturing processes from falling
into competitors’ hands.9 The complexity and difficulty of manufacturing insulin
and similar drugs10 means that trade secret protections around manufacturing
processes effectively stymie new entrants to the insulin market.11 The relative
lack of competition keeps prices high to the detriment of those who rely on insulin to survive.12 A reduction in trade secret protections for the processes these
three companies use to manufacture insulin would facilitate the entry of new
competitors into the insulin market, thus reducing prices.
This Note serves to: (1) provide background on insulin and its uses for treating diabetes; (2) describe the current intellectual property environment around
pharmaceuticals; (3) lay foundation for the current regulatory framework governing insulin specifically; (4) describe how the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 and
the Biosimilars Act of 2010 create the opportunity for less expensive follow-on
forms of insulin; and (5) argue that relaxing the trade secret protections around
the insulin manufacturing process is likely to be successful in increasing competition and lowering prices in the insulin market.
II.

BACKGROUND

The following sections provide background information on insulin and its
clinical application for managing diabetes. To facilitate the reader’s understanding of the particular policy challenges insulin pricing poses, this section goes into
detail about how the prevalence of diabetes raises the level of urgency surrounding this issue. This section also discusses how insulin differs from chemical medications and the problems that arise as a result of the differences between the
two.
A. DIABETES

The primary application of commercial insulin is to manage diabetes mellitus,
a chronic condition commonly referred to simply as diabetes.13 Diabetes is
caused by the body’s inability to properly regulate the level of glucose, a type of

8 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 3 (2019); W.
Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Price Competition and Innovation,
101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1046 (2016).
9 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1046.
10 Id. at 1048-49.
11 Id.
12 Greene & Riggs, supra note 3, at 1171.
13 MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/symptomscauses/syc-20371444 (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
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sugar, in the blood.14 Cells throughout the body require glucose for energy, and
the pancreas produces insulin to prevent glucose levels from rising too high.15
There are two types of diabetes.16 Though the exact cause is unknown, type
one diabetes results when the body’s immune system destroys the cells in the
pancreas that produce insulin.17 Type two diabetes, which is far more common
in the U.S.,18 is thought to be influenced by lifestyle factors such as diet and
exercise.19 Cells in the body of a patient with type two diabetes become resistant
to insulin such that the body cannot produce enough to regulate blood glucose
levels effectively.20
Diabetes, particularly type two, is extremely common in the U.S.21 According
to estimates by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over
thirty million Americans, or slightly less than one in every ten, suffer from diabetes.22 Worse still, the CDC estimates that nearly seven million of those thirty
million people have not been formally diagnosed.23 The issue with diabetes, however, is not just in the number of people affected with the disease. Diabetes also
affects some regions and ethnicities more than others. The highest concentrations of people with diabetes are in the southeastern U.S.,24 and the condition
disproportionately affects African-Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native
Americans.25
Diabetes takes an enormous toll on public health in the United States, both
in terms of loss of life and productivity, and in terms of the financial burden it
places on both those with the disease and the healthcare industry more generally.26 In 2013, the CDC estimates that diabetes caused roughly 75,000 deaths
among people aged fifteen and older, and that diabetes-linked conditions such
as renal failure and heart disease caused an additional 293,000 deaths in the same

Id.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes (last visited
Oct. 3, 2019).
19 Id.
20 MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/symptomscauses/syc-20371444 (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
21 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes (last visited
Oct. 3, 2019).
22 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS
REPORT, 2020 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetesstatistics-report.pdf.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 5.
25 Id. at 4.
26 See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: DIABETES STATE
BURDEN TOOLKIT, https://nccd.cdc.gov/Toolkit/DiabetesBurden (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
14
15
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age group.27 The CDC further estimates that in 2013, diabetes and diabeteslinked conditions cost the United States over $300 billion in healthcare costs.28
Without an adequate supply of insulin, a diabetic patient can quickly experience severe medical issues, including renal failure, amputation, heart disease,
blindness, and even death.29 The urgency surrounding the issue of access to insulin reflects the often devastating health effects individuals with diabetes suffer
when they do not get the required dose. A Yale Diabetes Center survey conducted in 2017 found that one quarter of respondents reported undercompliance
with their prescribed dose of insulin because of the cost.30 Of those patients
reporting cost-related underuse, one third reported that they had not discussed
the cost issue with their doctor,31 which suggests that the problem of underuse
of insulin by diabetics is perhaps even worse than we realize. The fundraising
website Go Fund Me lists hundreds of fundraisers for individual diabetics in
need of help paying for insulin, with fundraising goals ranging from a few hundred dollars to several thousand.32
The following section discusses insulin in greater depth and explains how its
discovery and evolution over the past century have contributed to the current
pricing crisis.
B. INSULIN

1. How Insulin Works in the Body
As mentioned previously, insulin is a hormone that occurs naturally in the
body.33 As such, pharmaceutical insulin is what is known as a biologic drug, or
simply a biologic. Biologics are substances derived from a living organism and
are distinct from chemical medications that are manufactured purely through
chemical synthesis.34 Biologics have a broad array of clinical applications,

Id. (2013 is the most recent year for which such data are available.)
Id.
29 Stanley, supra note 5.
30 Darby Herkert et al., Cost-Related Insulin Underuse Among Patients With Diabetes, 179:1 JAMA
INTERNAL MEDICINE 112, 112-13 (2019).
31 Id. at 113.
32 GO FUND ME,
https://www.gofundme.com/mvc.php?route=homepage_norma/
search&term=insulin (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). Appeals for help paying for insulin have become so commonplace that Go Fund Me published an article specifically advising individuals
of alternative sources of insulin and how best to use Go Fund Me to raise money to pay for
it. GO FUND ME: HOW TO GET INSULIN WHEN YOU CAN’T AFFORD IT: 6 IDEAS,
https://www.gofundme.com/c/blog/how-to-get-insulin (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
33 MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/symptomscauses/syc-20371444 (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
34 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH (CBER), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
27
28
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including treatment of cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, and infertility.35 Some examples of biologics include vaccines, gene therapy products, and recombinant therapeutic proteins such as insulin.36 The distinction between biologics and chemical medications is important because there are major differences between these
two classes of products in terms of their structure and manufacture and how they
fit into the regulatory framework for pharmaceuticals. This regulatory framework
will be discussed in detail in later sections.
In general, the molecules of which biologics are comprised are much larger
and more complex than the molecules that make up chemical medications.37 One
commentator provides the following example to illustrate the difference between
chemical drugs and biologic drugs: “In terms of size and rough complexity, if an
aspirin were a bicycle, a small biologic would be a Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an F-16 fighter jet.”38 Insulin is a small biologic made up of a
chain of fifty-one amino acids, and the specific way in which the amino acid chain
folds and twists determines the chemical identity of the substance.39
The pancreas, part of the endocrine system in human beings and some other
mammals, produces insulin to regulate the level of glucose in the blood.40 With
a few exceptions, insulin must be injected into the layer of fat beneath the skin
in order for the body to metabolize it.41 If swallowed, digestive acids would break
the protein in the hormone down so as to render it ineffective for purposes of
managing blood glucose.42
2. Development of the Manufacturing Process for Pharmaceutical Insulin
Frederick Banting, a physician in Toronto, Canada, discovered insulin in 1921
with the help of graduate student Charles Best.43 From the beginning, insulin was
seen as something of a ‘miracle drug,’ transforming diabetes from a lethal disease
into a manageable chronic condition.44 Motivated by the public health
Id.
Id.
37 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1026.
38 Id. (citation omitted).
39 David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing
Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 143, 188 (2005).
40 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/medicationmanagement/insulin-other-injectables/insulin-basics (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Greene & Riggs, supra note 3, at 1171. The splitting of the 1923 Nobel Prize for the
discovery between Banting and James Macleod, the head of the physiology lab at the University of Toronto where Banting and Best made their discovery, rather than between Banting
and Best is a fascinating story of academic politics that is beyond the scope of this note. See
generally, Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48(12) CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 2270
(2002).
44 Greene & Riggs, supra note 3, at 1171.
35
36
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implications of their discovery rather than the potential for monetizing it, Banting and Best sold the patent for insulin to the University of Toronto for a mere
one dollar.45
In its nearly 100-year history, pharmaceutical insulin, or commercial insulin
as it is sometimes called, has undergone numerous changes.46 In the early days
after the discovery, insulin makers manufactured the substance using extracts
from the whole pancreas of a cow or pig.47 This method posed two serious problems. First, this process made it difficult to manufacture at the scale needed to
meet demand.48 Second, the animal extracts used also caused severe side effects
in some patients.49
Today, insulin production no longer relies on livestock, but rather on microorganisms.50 In the early 1980’s, insulin makers began using recombinant DNA
technology to manipulate the DNA of microbes such as E. coli, essentially reprogramming the microbe at the DNA level.51 These genetically altered microbes
produce insulin that is chemically identical to the insulin the human pancreas
produces naturally.52 Recombinant insulin does not cause the same side effects
that animal extract varieties once did.53 It also achieves a much higher standard
of purity and effectiveness,54 with several different subtypes available depending
on the patient’s specific needs.55 The first recombinant human insulin to receive
FDA approval was Eli Lilly’s Humulin in 1982.56
Insulin makers have since made small modifications to recombinant human
insulin’s molecular structure to create what are known as insulin analogs.57 There
are five different types of insulin analog available today: “long-acting, rapid-acting, intermediate-acting, short-acting (regular insulin), and premixed.”58 These
various types allow diabetic patients to control the window of effectiveness of
the insulin to counteract the blood glucose spike that occurs during and shortly

Id.
Id. at 1172.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes (last visited
Oct. 3, 2019).
56 See Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 165.
57 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 1 (2018).
58 Id.
45
46
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after meals.59 The vast majority of diabetic patients in the U.S. use some form of
insulin analog to manage the condition.60
In the U.S., the price of insulin rose by 700% over the past twenty years.61
Price spikes vary depending on the specific type of the drug.62 For example, between 2001 and 2015, “the price of one type of insulin (insulin lispro) increased
585% (from $35 to $234 per vial).”63 Depending on the patient’s needs, a vial of
insulin may last only about two weeks,64 resulting in an out-of-pocket cost of
roughly $500 per month for an uninsured person. In short, diabetes presents a
tremendous public health challenge in the U.S. and the lack of affordable insulin
seriously exacerbates the issue. A primary contributor to the insulin pricing issue
is the intellectual property protections available to manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, which the next section explores in detail.
III.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR
PHARMACEUTICALS

The purpose of intellectual property law is to codify an innovator’s property
rights in her innovation.65 Pharmaceutical products and other forms of medical
intervention are perhaps one of the best examples of the need to balance the
rights of the innovator with the social utility of the innovation.66 Modern pharmaceutical technology is one example of an ethical quandary that has played out
in capitalist societies throughout history: how does a government protect the
average, non-wealthy person from being priced out of a product necessary for
survival without punishing or unduly disincentivizing the maker of that product?67
Some governments respond to this dilemma by recognizing the innovator’s
property rights in the innovation itself through intellectual property law.68 In the
U.S., pharmaceutical companies benefit from several different types of

Id.
Id. (“In 2000, of privately insured adults with type 2 diabetes using insulin, 19% were
using analog insulins; by 2010, 96% were using these products.”)
61 Pendergrass, supra note 4.
62 See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 1 (2018).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10986, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION 1 (2018).
66 Alexandra E. Blasi, An Ethical Dilemma: Patents & Profits v. Access & Affordability, 33 J.
LEGAL MED. 115, 115 (2012).
67 Id.
68 KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10986, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION 1 (2018).
59
60
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protection for intellectual property. The following sections discuss three such
protections: (1) patent, (2) regulatory exclusivity, and (3) trade secret.
A. PATENT

Patents provide the innovator with a period of time during which competitors
are excluded from manufacturing the product, an arrangement that is essentially
a temporary, lawful monopoly.69 Pharmaceutical innovators may apply for patent
protection for the active ingredient in a product, the delivery method, a manufacturing method, a device or other technology needed to administer the drug,
or other innovations.70 The term of patent protection lasts twenty years,71 and
legislation specific to pharmaceuticals provides for up to an additional five years
to account for delays in FDA approval.72
In exchange for the period of exclusivity, the patent holder must disclose the
details of the innovation for use by others in the future.73 The Patent Act of 1952
requires that the patent holder disclose:
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.74
Thus, the incentive to innovate is preserved while providing the public an opportunity to benefit later from more competition and lower prices.75
The patent system is not without its drawbacks. One issue in the pharmaceutical context is under-disclosure.76 The benefits of the patent system to society at
large rely on full disclosure of the details of the innovation in the patent application so that competitors can replicate the innovation once the patent expires,
thereby lowering the price.77 However, the majority of patents do not describe

69 See KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 6 (2019).
70 Id. at 13.
71 Id. at 10.
72 Id.
73 Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
401, 407 (2010).
74 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2018).
75 See Devlin, supra note 73, at 407.
76 Id. at 411.
77 Id. at 409.
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the invention in enough detail for competitors to replicate it once the patent
expires.78
B. REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY

Another form of intellectual property protection available to pharmaceutical
innovators is regulatory exclusivity, which prevents the FDA from approving a
follow-on product for a specified period of time.79 There are two types of regulatory exclusivity:
(1) data exclusivity, which precludes applicants from relying on
FDA’s safety and effectiveness findings for the reference product … to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of the followon product; and (2) marketing exclusivity, which precludes FDA
from approving any other application for the same pharmaceutical product and use, regardless of whether the applicant has
generated its own safety and effectiveness data.80
The Biosimilars Act, discussed in detail in subsequent sections, provides marketing exclusivity for name-brand biologics by barring applications for FDA approval of follow-on products for four years after the name-brand product is licensed.81 For eight years after that, the FDA will accept applications for approval
of follow-on products, but will not approve any of them for licensing.82 Regulatory exclusivity bears some similarity to patent in that it arises in federal statute
and provides a fixed term of protection that must eventually lapse.83
C. TRADE SECRET

Trade secrecy protects information that: (1) confers economic benefit upon
the holder because (2) it is not generally known and (3) the secrecy of which the
holder takes reasonable steps to preserve.84 As a general matter, an innovator
must choose between patent protection and trade secrecy protection.85 Trade
secret is an attractive choice because it covers innovations that are, for whatever

Id. at 411.
KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 23 (2019).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 24-25.
82 Id. at 25.
83 See Id. at 23-24.
84 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. R. 1, 6-7
(2007).
85 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1042.
78
79
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reason, not eligible for patent, and because it is much cheaper to maintain than
patent protection.86
Trade secrecy is an outlier in the law of intellectual property in that the approach it takes to the balancing of interests is very different from that of patent.
Rather than balancing the interests of the society at large with those of the innovator, trade secrecy has been criticized for most often benefitting the holder of
the secret while discouraging competition by hindering the sharing of information.87 Another criticism is that trade secret provides cover for companies
who engage in business practices that put the public at risk.88
Furthermore, in contrast to a patent’s fixed period of exclusivity, there is no
prescribed term of trade secret protection. The holder has a cause of action for
misappropriation of the information for as long as the holder benefits economically and takes reasonable steps to preserve the secrecy.89 Pharmaceutical companies, and makers of biologics in particular, patent the products themselves and
rely heavily on trade secrecy to protect their manufacturing processes and techniques.90
In the following sections, this Note explores how the intellectual property
environment surrounding pharmaceuticals perpetuates the insulin pricing crisis
discussed above,91 and how policymaking could potentially alleviate what has become a serious public health problem in the U.S.
IV.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INSULIN AND BEYOND

As discussed previously, insulin has been commercially available as a pharmaceutical product for nearly a century.92 In that time, the pharmaceutical industry has undergone massive growth, becoming one of the largest and most profitable industries in the country.93 This industry growth, as well as tremendous
technological advances in pharmaceuticals and increased focus on public safety,
have resulted in a complex statutory framework relevant to all pharmaceuticals,
and to insulin specifically. The following sections discuss how, in spite of
86 Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety Should Trump Corporate
Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1138 (2018).
87 See Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1044. The tangentially related issue of under-disclosure
discussed in Section III(A), infra, would seem to leave no viable alternative. However, the more
that is known about a product, the easier the disclosure requirement is to enforce. Patent
requires disclosure even if it does not always get it in full, whereas the entire purpose of trade
secret is to withhold information. See Id. at 1044-45.
88 See generally, Zink, supra note 86 (identifying examples of chemical companies using trade
secret protection to hide the health hazards of their products).
89 Id. at 1138.
90 Id. at 1046.
91 Supra section II.
92 Supra section II(B).
93 Catherine D. Deangelis, Big Pharma Profits and the Public Loses, 94(1) MILBANK QUARTERLY
30, 30 (2016).
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legislative efforts to increase competition and lower prices for pharmaceuticals,
insulin prices remain burdensome, if not prohibitive, for many patients.
A. BIOLOGICS UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (1938)
AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT (1944)

Insulin and a handful of other biologics occupy a somewhat confusing space
in federal law that originates in a century-old bifurcation in the way drugs are
regulated in the U.S.94 This section provides an overview of this history to clarify
the current regulatory environment for insulin.
The FDA has authority to review and approve all prescription drugs before
they can enter the market.95 However, this authority arises out of two different
pieces of legislation with differing requirements.96 The first is the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA).97 The FFDCA defines “drug” in
relevant part as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals.”98 Pharmaceutical products within the scope of FFDCA include insulin and a small number of other
biologics, and all chemical medications.99
The second is the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (PHSA).100 The PHSA
is a recodification of the Biologics Act of 1902, “the first enduring scheme of
national regulation for any pharmaceutical product.”101 Because the Biologics
Act focused mostly on vaccines, its recodification in the PHSA is restricted to
biologics,102 and the pharmaceutical products in scope of the PHSA include the
majority of biologic drugs (i.e., all biologics other than the few in scope of the
FFDCA).103 The version of the PHSA in effect today defines “biological product” as:

94 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 3 (2019).
95 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11075, FDA AND DRUG PRICES:
FACILITATING ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS 1 (2019).
96 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 5 (2019).
97 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2018).
98 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018).
99 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 3-4 (2019).
100 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A (2018).
101 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 147. The Biologics Act was enacted in response to multiple
incidents of vaccine contamination that resulted in numerous deaths. The Act only provided
for regulation of manufacturing conditions, labeling, and interstate traffic of drugs, and not
the safety or efficacy of the products themselves. Id. at 148.
102 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 152.
103 See AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND
BIOSIMILARS: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 3-4 (2019).
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a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood
component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any
chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.104
Until 1941, pursuant to its agreement with Banting and Best, the researchers
who discovered insulin,105 the University of Toronto monitored and tested each
batch of insulin for quality prior to sending it to market.106 In 1941, just days
before the University’s patent on insulin expired, Congress amended the FFDCA
to empower the FDA to regulate insulin out of fear that safety standards would
decrease once the University lost the right to examine each batch.107 Insulin and
a handful of other small biologics remained within the purview of the FFDCA,
even though the vast majority of modern biologics fall within the scope of the
PSHA.108 The next section will focus on legislative efforts to remedy some of
these existing problems by creating a “follow-on” pharmaceutical market.
B. CREATION OF THE FOLLOW-ON PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET

Congress’ attempt to increase competition in this area while still preserving
intellectual property protections, often referred to as the “follow-on” pharmaceutical market, is the next piece of the insulin pricing puzzle. In most instances,
the U.S. differs from most other industrialized nations in that it takes a generally
free-market approach to prescription drug pricing.109 This is to say that pharmaceutical companies are free to charge whatever the market will bear for their
products, and the government has no power to intervene.110 This system stands
in contrast to those operative in Canada and the European Union, where singlepayer healthcare systems give the government more power to keep prices manageable.111 The U.S. government is not empowered to negotiate prices with

42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2018).
Supra section II(B).
106 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 153.
107 Id.
108 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8-9 (2019).
109 Marie Salter, Reference Pricing: An Effective Model for the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry?, 35 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 413, 415 (2015).
110 Hannah Brennan, et. al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent
Use for Health, 18 Yale J. L. & Tech. 275, 284 (2016).
111 Jessica R. Underwood, What the E.U. has that the U.S. Wants: An Analysis of Potential Regulatory Systems for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 419, 423
(2007).
104
105
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pharmaceutical companies, even for those drugs covered under government
healthcare programs such as Medicare.112
The trade-off inherent in this unusual paradigm is punishingly high costs for
prescriptions coupled with an extraordinary degree of pharmaceutical innovation.113 Two federal statutes, discussed below, the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984)
and the Biosimilars Act (2009), attempt to navigate the narrow path between
protecting commercial incentives to innovate and expanding American consumers’ access to life-saving medical products, with different degrees of success.
Broadly speaking, the process by which prescription drugs arrive on the market in the United States under these two statutes is as follows. First, a drug innovator spends billions of dollars developing and testing a brand new medication.114 Second, the innovator obtains approval to market the drug from the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)115 and files a patent application with the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in which it must disclose the molecular
structure of the substance and how to manufacture it.116 Third, the innovator
enjoys twenty years117 of protection from competition under the patent and may
charge for the product whatever amount the market will bear.118 Finally, once
the patent expires, different drug manufacturers can begin to produce follow-on
versions of the drug119 and obtain abbreviated approval from the FDA for the
follow-on product.120 The follow-on product often enters the market at a price
tremendously lower than that of the reference product.121 The next sections describe the mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act in more
detail.

Hannah Brennan et. al., supra note 110, at 285-86.
See generally id. (discussing the case of sofosbuvir, a medication first marketed in 2013 to
cure hepatitis C at a staggering cost of $100,000.)
114 Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex,
63 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 275, 283 (2008).
115 FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: ABOUT FDA PRODUCT APPROVAL,
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/approvals-fda-regulated-products/about-fda-productapproval (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
116 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 8-9 (2019).
117 In certain circumstances, the PTO may grant an additional five years of patent protection
to account for delays in FDA approval. Id. at 10.
118 Hannah Brennan et. al., supra note 110, at 284.
119 The term “follow-on” encompasses both generic products (exact copies of chemical
medications, discussed fully in section IV(B)(1), infra) and biosimilar products (approximations
of biologic medications, discussed fully in section IV(B)(2), infra).
120 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019).
121 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1027.
112
113
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1. The Hatch-Waxman Act (1984)
The first piece of federal legislation that provided an abbreviated pathway to
approval for follow-on drugs was the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984.122 The Act is commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act in honor of its co-authors, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Representative
Henry Waxman (D-CA).123 The Hatch-Waxman Act made a series of amendments to the FFDCA, meaning that its provisions only apply to chemical medications and the handful of biologics, including insulin, that the FFDCA regulates.124
The Hatch-Waxman Act created two different abbreviated pathways to FDA
approval for follow-on products.125 The purpose of these two options is to remove costly barriers to FDA approval for new manufacturers of previously approved products, thereby increasing competition and lowering prices.126 The first
option is the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).127 In an ANDA, the
maker of the generic drug must show proof that the generic is a bioequivalent of
(i.e., has a chemical structure identical to) the name-brand drug, or reference
product.128 FDA approval for the reference product required extensive clinical
trial data proving the drug’s efficacy, safety, and purity.129 The pathway to FDA
approval under an ANDA is abbreviated in that the maker of the generic need
not repeat the clinical trials but instead may rely on the data for the reference
product because the two substances are chemically identical.130 This saves the
generic drug maker considerable time and money, thus facilitating the greatly
reduced price.131
The second option is known as the “505(b)(2)” pathway. Section 505(b)(2)
of the Act “applies only to those variations from approved drugs that cannot be
brought under an ANDA.”132 A 505(b)(2) applicant does not need to show bioequivalence to the reference product, and may rely on clinical trial data produced
122 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR
THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019).
123 Erik Neumann, Sen. Orrin Hatch’s influence of US healthcare, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2019)
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/sen-orrin-hatchs-influence-us-healthcare/story?id=60120082.
124 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 170.
125 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A
PRIMER 6 (2016).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Pub. L. No. 98-417 (j)(2)(A)(III)(iv).
129 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019).
130 Id. at 20-21.
131 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A
PRIMER 6 (2016).
132 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 198.
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by a third party (such as the maker of the reference product).133 What section
505(b)(2) amounts to is an abbreviated approval method for the very small number of biologics that fall within the scope of the FFDCA.134
The FDA has approved a handful of follow-on biologic drugs under section
505(b)(2), perhaps the most contentious of which was its approval of a human
growth hormone called Omnitrope, which is used primarily for enhancement of
fertility in women, in 2006.135 Sandoz, the manufacturer of Omnitrope, claimed
in its application for approval that Omnitrope was “indistinguishable” from the
reference product, Genotropin.136 The FDA, however, initially refused to review
Sandoz’s application for abbreviated approval for Omnitrope, citing uncertainty
as to whether Omnitrope could be shown to be sufficiently similar to Genotropin as required under section 505(b)(2).137 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that FDA had a duty to review Sandoz’s application for
approval within the statutory 180-day period, thereby affirming that biologics
could theoretically qualify for approval under section 505(b)(2).138 The FDA indicated later that the FFDCA did not create an abbreviated pathway for the biologics outside of its scope, and that Congress would need to act in order for one
to exist.139
The FDA has approved just one follow-on insulin product under HatchWaxman.140 In 2015, Eli Lilly received FDA approval to market Basaglar, a follow-on insulin that references Lantus, a drug manufactured by Sanofi.141 For reasons that will be discussed in greater detail in section IV(C), infra, Basaglar has
had very little impact, if any, on pricing in the insulin market.142
Hatch-Waxman has been extraordinarily successful in increasing competition
in the market for chemical medications and lowering prices while preserving

Id.
Id. This interpretation of 505(b)(2)’s grant of authority has not been free of controversy.
The FFDCA does not specifically include or exclude biologics in its broad definition of “drug”
(see supra note 98), but the FDA quickly realized that the differences between chemical medications and biologics created confusion and uncertainty as to what path to approval these
follow-on products should take. Id. at 196-97.
135 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 7 (2019).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d 29, 38 (2006) (rejecting the FDA’s argument that
the 180-day period was aspirational rather than mandatory).
139 Anna Wilde Mathews & Jeanne Whalen, FDA Clears Copycat Version of Human Growth
Hormone, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114904669181067236.
140 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018).
141 Id.
142 Id.
133
134
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incentives for drug companies to innovate new products.143 That said, most biologics are outside the scope of Hatch-Waxman because they are regulated under
the PHSA, rather than the FFDCA.144 The following section addresses legislation tailored to address this much larger group of products.
2. The Biosimilars Act (2009)
Congress passed the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009,145 commonly known as the Biosimilars Act, as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (also known as “The Affordable Care Act,”
President Obama’s signature legislative achievement, addressing a host of issues,
including health insurance, health care delivery, and public health in the U.S.).146
Many parts of the Affordable Care Act, including the Biosimilars Act, are amendments to the PHSA.147 Thus, the Biosimilars Act applies to the biologics that are
within the scope of the PHSA.148
The Biosimilars Act mirrors Hatch-Waxman in that it provides an abbreviated pathway to FDA approval (referred to in the statute as “licensing”) for postpatent forms of biologics.149 Because of their much more complex molecular
structure, biologic drug makers need not show that their product is a generic, or
identical to the reference product on a molecular level.150 They must only show
that their product is either (1) biosimilar to the reference product, or (2) interchangeable with the reference product.151 These critical terms are defined in the
statute, as discussed below.
A product is biosimilar to the reference product if it meets five criteria.152
First, it must be shown to be sufficiently similar through analytical studies, animal
studies, and clinical trials.153 Second, it must use the same mechanism(s) of action
for the condition(s) of use.154 Third, it must be intended to be prescribed for the

143 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the
2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 417, 417-18 (2011).
144 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8-9 (2019).
145 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2018).
146 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
147 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8 (2019).
148 See Id.
149 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A
PRIMER 12 (2016). The Biosimilars Act also “established regulatory exclusivities that are available to brand-name and follow-on firms…[and] stipulate[d] intricate procedures for identifying and resolving patent disputes with respect to follow-on biologics.” Id.
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(2018).
151 Id.
152 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
153 Id.
154 Id.
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same condition(s) as the reference product.155 Fourth, the method of administration, dosage, and potency must be the same as those of the reference product.156
Fifth, the manufacturing facility must meet the relevant standards to assure
safety, purity, and potency.157
A product is interchangeable with a reference product if meets three criteria.158 First, it must be biosimilar to the reference product.159 Second, it must
produce the same clinical results as the reference product.160 Third, the risk of
alternating between the reference product and the interchangeable product must
not place the patient at additional risk.161
Because insulin falls within the regulatory scope of the FFDCA, it was never
eligible for the abbreviated approval pathway provided for in the Biosimilars Act,
which only applies to products regulated under the PHSA.162 The limited use of
the 505(b)(2) option under the Hatch-Waxman Act has been available, but an
important provision of the Biosimilars Act only recently made this distinction
moot for purposes of expedited FDA approval.163 The Biosimilars Act, enacted
on March 23, 2010, provides that no later than ten years from the date of enactment, all applications for approvals of biologics submitted under Hatch-Waxman
will transition into applications for biosimilar licenses under the Biosimilars
Act.164
What this means for insulin is that any applications for FDA approval of a
follow-on product must meet the biosimilarity or interchangeability standards
discussed above. FDA guidance on the transition indicates that any name-brand
insulins previously approved have transitioned into licenses under the Biosimilars Act165 and that sponsors of applications for follow-on insulin (and other
biologics currently approved under Hatch-Waxman) must resubmit any applications currently pending under Hatch-Waxman.166 For the purposes of this

Id.
Id.
157 Id.
158 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4) (2018).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 1-2 (2018).
163 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS:
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8-9 (2019).
164 Id.
165 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INTERPRETATION OF THE “DEEMED TO BE A LICENSE”
PROVISION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2018).
166 Chad A. Landmon & Christopher M. Gallo, Ph.D., Fixing the Follow-On Insulin Regulatory
Approval “Dead Zone,” BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/fixing-the-follow-on-insulin-regulatory-approval-dead-zone-0001.
155
156
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Note, suffice it to say that the bifurcated pathways to approval are joined as of
March 23, 2020.
Given the incentives for makers of follow-on products, the obvious question
is why, after nearly a century of progress and an extraordinary degree of demand,
there is still only one follow-on insulin. To answer this question, the following
section explores the shortcomings of the abbreviated approval mechanisms provided for in the Hatch-Waxman and Biosimilars Acts with regard to biologic
drugs.
C. THE PROBLEM WITH ABBREVIATED APPROVAL AND TRADE SECRECY

Hatch-Waxman’s abbreviated approval pathway mechanism has been highly
successful in lowering prices for chemical medications.167 However, in spite of
the fact that insulin has been eligible for abbreviated approval via the 505(b)(2)
option since 1984,168 only one follow-on insulin product, Basaglar, is currently
on the market,169 and insulin prices continue to rise.170 As of March 23, 2020, the
transition to licenses means that insulin will continue to be eligible for abbreviated approval, now under the Biosimilars Act. The Biosimilars Act attempted to
recreate the success of Hatch-Waxman and facilitate more competition in the
biologics market.171 However, this goal has not been realized because abbreviated approval mechanisms do not account for the ways in which biologics are
different from chemical medications.172
As mentioned, biologics are comprised of much larger and more complex
molecules than chemical medications.173 In fact, it is the case that the exact molecular structure of some biologics has never been precisely described because
the analytical technology required to do so does not yet exist.174 This is one of
the most salient differences between biologics and chemical medications from a
regulatory perspective. Once a generic drug maker knows the molecular structure
of a chemical medication, the substance can be reverse-engineered and synthesized in many different ways, all arriving at the same result.175 This is not the case
with biologics. Without specific information about how the reference product
was manufactured, it is very difficult to say with certainty how similar the followKelly, supra note 143, at 417-18.
See Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 191.
169 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018).
170 Julia Belluz, The absurdly high cost of insulin, explained, VOX (May 24, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/3/18293950/why-is-insulin-so-expensive#.
171 Kelly, supra note 143, at 417.
172 Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 226 (2015).
173 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1026.
174 Id. at 1036.
175 Id. at 1034.
167
168
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on product is to the reference product.176 As discussed in section III(C), makers
of biologics like insulin often use patents to protect their products and trade
secrecy to protect their manufacturing processes. Since trade secret protection
can theoretically last forever, the provision of an abbreviated path to approval is
of very little use because makers of follow-on products will not be able to
demonstrate that their products are biosimilar to the name brand products.
Now that the transition to licensed products under the Biosimilars Act is effective, any follow-on insulins must meet the requirements of biosimilarity or
interchangeability as described above.177 This is a higher standard than what
Hatch-Waxman formerly required of follow-on biologics under 505(b)(2), meaning that the barrier to entry for follow-on insulins that could help lower prices
just got higher.178 Given the sluggishness of the follow-on insulin market until
now (only one follow-on product for a drug that has been available for decades),
179 the transition seems likely to stall the market even further. The final part of
this Note argues that a reduction of trade secret protection for manufacturing
processes is needed to address the urgent public health problem that insulin pricing poses.
V.

FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE INSULIN PRICING PROBLEM

The discussion above paints a grim picture. The abbreviated pathway to approval provided for under federal law has not achieved its goal of increasing
competition and lowering prices in the insulin market. As progress stalls, many
people with diabetes continue to struggle to pay for the medication they need as
insulin prices continue to rise.
It should be noted that some steps have been taken in 2019 by both corporations and governments to alleviate the insulin pricing crisis. For example, the
three major insulin manufacturers, Eli Lilly, Sanofi, and Novo Nordisk, have
each announced that they will lower the list prices of their insulin products.180
Furthermore, pharmacy benefits manager, Express Scripts, announced a price
cap of twenty-five dollars per month for its members.181 Colorado recently
passed legislation capping the price of insulin at $100 per month for insured patients.182
Id.
John White & Jennifer Goldman, Biosimilar and Follow-On Insulin: The Ins, Outs, and Interchangeability, 35:1 J. PHARMACY TECH. 25, 28 (2019).
178 Id.
179 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018).
180 Jacobsen, supra note 7.
181 Alison Kodjak, Express Scripts Takes Steps to Cut Insulin’s Price to Patients, NPR NEWS (Apr.
3, 2019) https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/03/709212404/expressscripts-takes-steps-to-cut-insulins-price-to-patients 1/.
182 Belluz, supra note 170.
176
177
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These efforts have one thing in common: they illustrate the fact that attention
is increasingly being directed at this issue. The increase in attention, however,
does not mean that the issue is solved. Unfortunately, all of the measures identified above are too limited in scope to serve as a complete solution to the problem. After all, Novo Nordisk or Express Scripts, for example, may decide tomorrow that the price guarantees they make today are no longer economically viable,
which will leave diabetic patients in much the same place they are now. Many
diabetics with health insurance in Colorado are seemingly out of immediate danger, but Colorado is home to only a very small percentage of all diabetics in the
U.S.183 This is why legislation at the federal level is necessary to correct this issue
for good.
As discussed in section III(C) infra, trade secret is one of the three forms of
intellectual property protection available to pharmaceutical innovators. In order
for an innovation to qualify for this protection, it must: (1) confer economic
benefit upon the holder, (2) not be generally known, and (3) be the object of
reasonable steps by the holder to maintain its secrecy.184
Makers of pharmaceutical products, and biologic drugs in particular, avail
themselves of trade secret protection quite liberally.185 Trade secret is particularly
attractive for protecting the manufacturing processes for insulin and other biologics, which has a major impact on competition.186 Biologics like insulin differ
considerably from chemical medications in terms of the difficulty of manufacturing them.187 Small-molecule chemical medications are relatively simple to describe scientifically,188 and a generic manufacturer can use any of a number of
methods to synthesize the compound, all of which produce a result easily proven
to be identical to the reference product.189
Insulin and other biologics, by contrast, have much more complex chemical
structures.190 Small differences in the method of synthesis can lead to broad variation in the final result.191 This means that showing biosimilarity is very difficult
unless the manufacturer uses the same method that the maker of the reference
product used.192 Furthermore, the precise molecular identity of some biologic
drugs is not known because the analytical techniques needed to make that determination do not yet exist.193
183 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS
REPORT, supra note 22.
184 Risch, supra note 84, at 6-7.
185 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1028.
186 Id.
187 Timmis, supra note 172 at 226.
188 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1033-34.
189 Id. at 1034.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1035.
192 Id. at 1036.
193 Id. at 1028.
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Crucially, to qualify for abbreviated approval under the Biosimilars Act, the
maker of the biosimilar must make a product that not only is biosimilar, but can
be shown to be biosimilar.194 Because trade secret protection can theoretically
last indefinitely,195 makers of would-be biosimilar insulins may never have access
to manufacturing process information, all but foreclosing the possibility of producing a follow-on insulin that the maker is able to prove is biosimilar to the
reference.196 A claim that X is the same as Y is impossible to prove or disprove
when Y’s identity is not known.
A scaling back of trade secret protection for pharmaceuticals would ameliorate this problem. The Biosimilars Act does not require the maker of a reference
product to disclose manufacturing information to any greater extent than is required under Hatch-Waxman, which means that it is unlikely to be successful in
increasing competition in the insulin market now that insulin is within its
scope.197 Insulin will likely continue to be more trouble than it is worth to biosimilar manufacturers.
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 provides an extremely broad scope of
the type of information that may be eligible for trade secret protection:
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing.198
The breadth of the protection available under the DTSA means that makers of
follow-on insulins will have an extremely difficult time showing that their products are biosimilar.
Statutorily eliminating biologics manufacturing process information from
trade secret eligibility (as an amendment to the Biosimilars Act, for example)
would force pharmaceutical companies to choose among three alternatives. They
could: (a) include process information in their patent application, (b) apply for
separate patent protection for the process and the product, or (c) leave the process information with no protection at all. Acknowledging choice (c) to be in all
likelihood the least popular of these, the net effect would be that the process by
which biologics like insulin are manufactured would become part of the public

194
195
196
197
198
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domain once the patent expires, rather than remaining secret indefinitely as it
does today.
This change would naturally have downstream effects, both positive and negative. The first advantage would be that insulin and other biologics would become more attractive to makers of follow-on products. Armed with the
knowledge needed to create a biosimilar without going through the costly process of additional research and development, follow-on firms could produce biosimilar insulins more cheaply.
The second advantage would be that the growing fund of public knowledge
about insulin and other biologics would facilitate greater innovation in the field
over time.199 By keeping critical information about their discoveries secret, pharmaceutical companies prevent other companies, universities, and private research firms from benefitting from it.200 Trade secret law is often criticized for
its tendency to cause redundancy and duplication of effort,201 and repetition of
clinical trials to prove that a follow-on is biosimilar or interchangeable can cost
hundreds of millions of dollars.202 A free flow of information about process in a
field where process has a tremendous influence on the identity and quality of the
final product203 would have substantial value to society.204
To that end, the third advantage to reducing trade secret protections would
be a rebalancing of the public and private interests at stake in the market for
insulin. The free-market approach to drugs and other medical products that operates in the U.S. presumes that the same forces at work in the markets for CocaCola and iPhones are at work in similar ways in the markets for insulin and other
healthcare products.205 As discussed previously, the free-market approach has
undoubted advantages,206 but the ethical implications of letting the market decide
who can afford insulin and who cannot should not be ignored. A reduction of
protection for an already immensely profitable industry207 would ease the burden
on people who rely on insulin for survival.
On the other hand, this approach does have drawbacks. For example, as with
any limitation on intellectual property protection, there is the concern that this
would decrease incentives to innovate.208 Insulin makers may decide to slow or
halt development of costly new products if they fear that they will not be able to
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recoup their losses.209 However, this particular issue seems to be of less concern
here than in other situations in which cutting edge biologics are not yet on the
market. Insulin’s age and long history in the market will likely shield it from this
negative effect because several safe and effective varieties already exist. Thus,
while reducing trade secret protections for biologics may have the effect of making some drug manufacturers more reluctant to develop entirely new biologic
drugs, it will likely have the opposite effect of improving competition for drugs
that are already on the market. Furthermore, a compromise might be made to
restrict the scaling-back of trade secret protection to insulin alone, rather than to
all biologics. Using insulin as a sort of pilot for a broader scheme of reducing
trade secret protections in the pharmaceutical industry would provide lawmakers
and the public with some context for the effectiveness of such a scheme.
A second potential drawback to this proposal is the possibility of a chilling
effect on insulin production in general. Once information about manufacturing
insulin enters the public domain, regulatory agencies like FDA will have the ability to set manufacturing standards accordingly.210 The more that is known about
a substance, the easier it is to regulate.211 An increase in the minimum standard
may raise production costs, thus deterring current producers from continuing to
make insulin, and discouraging new firms from entering the insulin market in the
first place.
Trade secrecy has kept the barriers to entry high for competitors in the insulin
market.212 There is no question that, in general, insulin and other biologics are
more difficult and more expensive to produce than chemical medications.213
Thus, the U.S. is unlikely to see drastic price reductions for these products such
as those that resulted from the enactment of Hatch-Waxman.214 However, the
current situation is clearly untenable for patients, and a scaling back of trade secrecy in the insulin market would likely help facilitate price reduction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, a relaxation of trade secret protection for
insulin is the intellectual property policy that is most likely to improve the current
state of the insulin market from the patient’s perspective. With a decrease in trade
secret protection, pharmaceutical companies will be forced to patent their manufacturing processes, thus ameliorating the problem of under-disclosure.215 The
patent system’s balancing of individual and public interest will lower the barriers
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to entry for follow-on firms once patents expire,216 and the expansion of the
public fund of knowledge will facilitate further innovation in the future.217
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